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This paper analyzes the impact vertical integration has on upstream collusion when the price of
the input is linear. As a ﬁrst step, the paper derives the collusive equilibrium that requires the
lowest discount factor in the inﬁnitely repeated game when one ﬁrm is vertically integrated. It
turns out this is the joint-proﬁt maximum of the colluding ﬁrms. The discount factor needed
to sustain this equilibrium is then shown to be unambiguously lower than the one needed
for collusion in the separated industry. While the previous literature has found it diﬃcult to
reconcile raising-rivals-costs strategies following a vertical merger with equilibrium behavior
in the static game, they are subgame perfect in the repeated game studied here.
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The anticompetitive eﬀects of vertical integration continue to be an active and controversial topic
of research in industrial economics. Antitrust decisions hostile towards vertical mergers in the US
in the 1950s and 1960s were based on the idea that vertical integration can harm competition by
removing resources from the input market, thereby leveraging monopoly power from one market
to another. These arguments have been labeled as na¨ ıve (Rey and Tirole, 2007) because they
lacked a rigorous formal basis. The more recent post-Chicago theories of vertical mergers (for
example, Salinger, 1988; Hart and Tirole, 1990; O’Brien and Schaﬀer, 1992) formally derived
many of the conclusions of the older theories. In game-theoretic models a connection is established
between vertical integration and potentially anticompetitive outcomes. The post-Chicago theories
of vertical integration diﬀer in various details, for example, assumptions about the integrated ﬁrm’s
market power and the contractual arrangements between the parties involved. There are several
dominating approaches though, including the “raising-rivals’-costs” and the “facilitating-collusion”
theory (Riordan, 2008).1
The raising-rivals’-costs theory of vertical merger highlights the possibility that vertically in-
tegrated ﬁrms may drive up the price of the input its unintegrated downstream rivals pay. In
a seminal contribution, Ordover, Saloner and Salop (1990), henceforth OSS (1990), argue that
vertical mergers might change the incentive to compete in the input market. When a vertically
integrated ﬁrm withdraws from the input market, upstream price competition becomes weaker.
This reduction in upstream competition implies a higher price for the input which means higher
cost for the non-integrated downstream ﬁrms. Since the downstream unit of the integrated ﬁrm
beneﬁts when its rivals’ costs are raised, the integrated ﬁrm is better oﬀ withdrawing from the
market compared to the case where it competes in the input market. In other words, it pays for
the integrated ﬁrm to forgo business with non-integrated downstream ﬁrms and instead gain from
its downstream rivals becoming less competitive as a result of the increased the price of the input.
The facilitating-collusion theory argues that vertical integration might make price agreements
among upstream ﬁrms easier. This concern has been expressed in the 1984 Non-horizontal Merger
1Riordan (2008) lists the “restoring monopoly power” as a third major post-Chicago theory of anticompetitive
vertical merger. On this approach, see Hart and Tirole (1990), Martin, Normann and Snyder (2001), and Rey and
Tirole (2007). Riordan’s classiﬁcation includes two further groups of theories, “eliminating markups” and “single
monopoly proﬁt”, which he attributes to the Chicago School.
1Guidelines and in several cartel cases (see Riordan, 2008). The idea has recently been formalized
in a dynamic model by Nocke and White (2007).2 They analyze collusion in the inﬁnitely repeated
game among upstream ﬁrms which charge two-part tariﬀs for the input. Nocke and White compare
the minimum discount factor required for collusion where one or more ﬁrms are vertically integrated
to the case of vertical separation. It turns out that vertical integration unambiguously facilitates
collusion.
This paper builds on and adds to both the raising-rivals’-costs and the facilitating-collusion
theory of vertical integration.3 It combines OSS’ (1990) idea that raising-rivals’-costs eﬀects change
the incentives of vertically integrated ﬁrms to compete in the input market with the presumption
that vertical integration facilitates collusion. In terms of the modeling strategy, the paper can
merge these two strands of the literature because they share several central assumptions (e.g.,
bilateral oligopoly with perfect competition upstream and imperfect competition downstream). In
this paper, the stage game is modeled as in OSS (1990) and allows for a raising-rivals’-costs eﬀect
but, in contrast to the static model of OSS (1990), this paper studies repeated interaction in a
dynamic model. The analysis of the impact of vertical integration on collusion is similar to Nocke
and White (2007). However, departing from Nocke and White (2007) and following OSS (1990),
downstream ﬁrms pay a linear price for the input here.
In a ﬁrst step, the paper provides a general analysis of upstream collusion in the presence
of an integrated ﬁrm. The analysis focuses on the collusive equilibrium that requires the lowest
discount factor (see Compte et al., 2002, for a similar analysis). It turns out that this equilibrium
is the one where the proﬁts of the colluding ﬁrms are maximized. In other words, the payoﬀ
dominant equilibrium also relaxes the incentive constraint as far as possible. Other equilibria
exist but they require a higher discount factor and give lower proﬁts to the colluding players.
A general ﬁnding of the analysis of collusion involving an integrated ﬁrm is that, because the
integrated ﬁrm operates both upstream and downstream, collusive pricing is rather diﬀerent from
the standard case of upstream collusion among vertically separated ﬁrms. One of these diﬀerences
is that the downstream unit of the integrated ﬁrm is involved in the collusion in that the price
of the downstream integrated ﬁrm is higher than its myopic best reply. This result conﬁrms and
2Riordan and Salop (1995) and Chen (2001) are also associated with the facilitating-collusion theory.
3The ﬁrst version of the present paper, Normann (2004), was developed independently of Nocke and White’s
ﬁrst version, Nocke and White (2003).
2extends Chen’s (2001) ﬁndings.
Based on this preparatory analysis, the paper derives two main results. First, the paper’s
contribution to the raising-rivals’-costs literature is to show that an outcome similar to the one
analyzed in OSS (1990) can actually be sustained as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Second,
the contribution to the facilitating collusion theory is that vertical integration facilitates collusion
also with linear contracts. To appraise these ﬁndings, more background information and details of
the results are needed.
Regarding the signiﬁcance of the ﬁrst main result, one needs to recall that OSS’ raising-rivals’-
costs argument has been criticized as not robust. Hart and Tirole (1990) and Reiﬀen (1992)
pointed out that, even though withdrawing from the input market is a proﬁtable strategy for the
integrated ﬁrm ex ante, it has an incentive to compete in the input market ex post. Therefore,
vertical integration does not make any diﬀerence at all in the static Nash equilibrium. The intuition
of this argument is that, since the price of the input increases once the integrated ﬁrm withdraws
from the input-good market, the integrated ﬁrm has an incentive to deviate. Rather than withdraw
from the input market, it will re-enter and undercut the upstream competitors’ price in order to
gain the business of the non-integrated downstream ﬁrms. The integrated ﬁrm’s upstream rivals
will anticipate such a deviation and will expect the re-entry in the market. In that case, upstream
competition is the same as without vertical integration in the static game.
Several papers in the literature have shown before that the outcome OSS (1990) propose can be
made robust and compatible with Nash equilibrium behavior (see OSS, 1992; Choi and Yi, 2000;
Church and Gandal, 2000).4 However, these papers are only partially successful in conﬁrming
the OSS (1990) approach as they circumvent, to some extent, the problem posed in the original
analysis. For example, in OSS (1992), non-integrated downstream ﬁrms procure the input in
a descending-price auction. In such a scenario, the integrated ﬁrm will drop out early in the
auction, the input market will be monopolized by the non-integrated upstream ﬁrm and, hence,
the outcome is indeed as in OSS (1990). Note that deviation from this equilibrium is prevented
by the rules of the auction. By dropping out, the integrated ﬁrm commits itself not to re-enter.
Thus, if available, commitment works in this case, but this does not answer the question raised by
Hart and Tirole (1990) and Reiﬀen (1992). Their point is whether commitment will be available
4For less closely related raising-rivals-costs models, see also Riordan (1998) and Chen and Riordan (2007).
3at all, and why vertical merger should enable to commit. Arguably, few markets are organized
as descending-price auctions. Therefore, it is still subject to debate whether the rasing-rivals’-
costs theory has implications beyond the perhaps somewhat restrictive scenarios the literature has
hitherto suggested.5
The present paper does not impose any assumptions on the extensive form that seem overly
narrow. The assumption of repeated interaction is simple and should be plausible for many indus-
tries. What the paper shows is that, even though the raising-rivals’-costs strategy is not tenable
as an equilibrium of the static game, it can be supported in the repeated game if repetition is
frequent enough. This result conﬁrms the informal arguments of Riordan and Salop (1995) that
OSS’ (1990) rasing-rivals’-costs idea can be saved from the Hart and Tirole (1990) and Reiﬀen
(1992) criticism with repeated interaction.
Of course, the result that the raising-rivals’-costs strategy can be an equilibrium in the repeated
game is not particularly surprising. We know from the Folk Theorem that almost anything can be
part of a repeated-game equilibrium. Thus, this ﬁnding alone is not suﬃcient to support a policy
conclusion against vertical mergers. At this point, the second main result of the paper—that
vertical integration facilitates collusion—comes into play. Given that upstream collusion requires
a lower discount factor when one ﬁrm vertically integrates, the raising-rivals’-costs strategy of the
integrated ﬁrm can actually be anti-competitive. For a certain range of discount factors, the input
market will be collusive only when there is vertical integration. This implies that ﬁrms have a
motive for anti-competitive vertical merger, as suggested by OSS (1990).
The facilitating-collusion theory has so far been restricted to two-part tariﬀs (Nocke and White,
2007). It is well known that two-part tariﬀs are more eﬃcient than linear contracts in simple
settings (Tirole, 1988). However, in more complex environments, Iyer and Villas-Boas (2003) and
Milliou, Petrakis and Vettas (2005) identify plausible cases where linear contracts emerge as the
endogenous form of contracting. Empirically, both forms of contracts seem relevant (see, e.g.,
Inderst and Valetti, 2007, who analyze linear contracts because of their relevance in supermarket
procurement). Thus, extending the results for the case of linear tariﬀs signiﬁcantly strengthens
5Choi and Yi (2000) assume that the integrated upstream ﬁrm can produce a specialized input for its downstream
division. The specialized input serves as a technological commitment not to supply the external input market.
Similarly, in Church and Gandal (2000), the ﬁnal good consists of a hardware component and complementary
software. When a hardware and a software ﬁrm integrate, they commit themselves not to compete by making the
software incompatible with rival technologies.
4the facilitating-collusion argument and should add to its policy relevance.
The paper further considers alternative scenarios which could potentially challenge the sig-
niﬁcance of the two main results. First, as noted already by OSS (1990), the non-integrated
downstream ﬁrms have an incentive for counter merger when their costs are raised. A success-
ful counter merger would eliminate the raising-rivals’-costs eﬀect and therefore the initial vertical
merger would not be worthwhile. OSS (1990) show that the counter merger can be prevented
when the integrated ﬁrm lowers the price of the input to such an extent that a counter merger
does not pay. The same argument also holds in the repeated-game setting of this paper although
there is a drawback. Upstream collusion becomes less proﬁtable and the critical discount factor
increases when the price is lowered. Second, there is the possibility of downstream collusion. In
an example with linear demand, the paper shows that there exists an incentive for vertical merger
and upstream collusion even when downstream collusion is a possibility.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 to 4 set up the modeling
framework and restate some of the results in the literature for this framework. Section 2 introduces
the market model and analyzes the static game for both the separated and vertically integrated
industries. OSS’ (1990) main argument is reviewed, and the Section concludes with Hart and
Tirole (1990) and Reiﬀen’s (1992) point that vertical integration does not aﬀect competition in
the static game. Section 3 introduces the repeated-game model. Section 4 provides the analysis
of the benchmark of collusion in the vertically separated industry. Sections 5 and 6 contain the
main contributions of the paper. Section 5 is on upstream collusion with vertical integration.
Despite the aforementioned diﬀerences to the standard model of collusion (without integration),
it is possible to compare the minimum discount factors required for collusion. This is done in
Section 6 where it is shown that vertical integration facilitates collusion. Section 6 also discusses
the eﬀects underlying this result and compares the results to those of Nocke and White (2007). It
further provides extensions of the model to bilateral oligopoly and an example with linear demand.
In Section 6, there is also a welfare analysis of vertical integration and a treatment of the case
where the downstream unit of the integrated ﬁrm operates as a proﬁt center. Section 7 analyzes
two alternative scenarios (counter merger and downstream collusion). Section 8 is the conclusion.
52 Model and static Nash equilibrium
Apart from minor diﬀerences, the stage-game is as in OSS (1990). There are n = 2 upstream
ﬁrms and m = 2 downstream ﬁrms. (The main results of the paper are generalized below for the
n,m > 2 case). Call the two upstream ﬁrms U1 and U2, and the two downstream ﬁrms D1 and
D2. The integrated ﬁrm will be called U1-D1. The upstream ﬁrms produce a homogenous input.
D1 and D2 transform the input on a one-to-one basis into a symmetrically diﬀerentiated ﬁnal
good.
The downstream level is modeled as follows. Downstream ﬁrms pay a linear price for the
input which constitutes their only cost. Deﬁne ci as the price per unit ﬁrm Di pays. There
is diﬀerentiated price competition at the downstream level and Qi(pi,pj) denotes the demand
function of Di, i,j=1,2,i 6= j. Symmetry implies that sales depend on prices but not on the
identities of the ﬁrms, that is, Q1(p1,p2) = Q2(p2,p1). Di’s proﬁts are
πDi = (pi − ci)Qi(pi,pj), i,j = 1,2,i 6= j. (1)
We impose the following assumptions on demand. Demand functions Qi(pi,pj) are twice con-
tinuously diﬀerentiable with ∂Qi/∂pi < 0, ∂Qi/∂pj > 0, and ∂Qi/∂pi + ∂Qi/∂pj < 0, i,j = 1,2,
i 6= j. These assumptions ensure downward sloping demand with substitute goods where the eﬀect
of a change in a ﬁrm’s own prices dominates the eﬀect resulting from a change of the rival ﬁrm’s
price. Further, we assume that goods are strategic complements, that is, ∂2πDi/∂pi∂pj > 0. A
ﬁnal assumption is that ∂2πDi/∂p2
i +∂2πDi/∂pi∂pj < 0. This assumption implies that own eﬀects
dominate cross eﬀects also in terms of the slope of the demand function. Together with the other
assumptions, this is suﬃcient to ensure the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium of the stage
game.6
Let p∗
i(ci,cj), i,j=1,2, i 6= j, denote the static Nash equilibrium prices at the downstream
level. In the static Nash equilibrium, the input prices (ci,cj) suﬃciently describe downstream
competition, and we will use Q∗




for πDi = (p∗
i(ci,cj) − ci)Q∗
i(ci,cj).
Given the above assumptions, OSS (1990) show that raising the cost of a downstream rival is
6The assumptions made to ensure a unique static Nash equilibrium merely simplify the analysis. Under weaker
assumptions, the stage game has multiple equilibria and one would need to distinguish between stable and unstable
equilibria (see OSS, 1990). Note also that somewhat weaker conditions might be suﬃcient to guarantee existence











> 0, i,j = 1,2,i 6= j, (2)
as follows from the envelope theorem.
We now turn to the upstream level. U1 and U2 have constant marginal cost which we set equal
to zero.7 The upstream ﬁrms are assumed to be perfect Bertrand competitors. This implies that
the lower of the two prices the upstream ﬁrms set constitutes the price of the input. Given the
price of the input, downstream ﬁrms purchase the number of units they require, Qi(pi,pj) (if they
procure externally at all). We will specify below how much the downstream ﬁrms purchase from
the two upstream ﬁrms when both upstream ﬁrms charge the same price.
When no ﬁrm is vertically integrated, upstream competition ` a la Bertrand implies Nash equi-
librium prices equal to (zero) marginal cost on the input market. This static Nash equilibrium is
unique. Both downstream ﬁrms purchase the good externally on the input market and they pay
the same price for it. So, we have c1 = c2 = 0.
When U1 and D1 are integrated, the downstream segment of U1-D1 obtains the input internally
at c1 = 0. The reason is that, for an integrated ﬁrm, the eﬀective price of the input is always
equal to own marginal production cost (Bonanno and Vickers, 1988). In this case, we have c1 = 0
accordingly. Since D2 only purchases the input externally, let c2 denote the price of the input
when U1 and D1 are integrated.8
The novel insight of OSS (1990) was to show that vertical integration may change the incentives
to compete in the input market. If U1-D1 can credibly commit to withdraw from the input market,
U2 will became the sole supplier of D2. In that case, U2 will charge some c2 > 0 for the input and
U1-D1 earns π∗
D1(0,c2). Suppose instead that U1-D1 competes in the input market. In that case,
Bertrand competition implies c2 = 0 and U1-D1 earns π∗
D1(0,0). Comparing the two outcomes, we
ﬁnd that U1-D1 makes no upstream proﬁt in either case, but, when withdrawing from the input
market, it makes a higher downstream proﬁt, π∗
D1(0,c2) > π∗
D1(0,0), due to the raising-rivals’-costs
eﬀect (2). Hence, U1-D1 prefers to commit to withdraw from the input market.
7The assumption of zero marginal cost is made to simplify the analysis but it is not necessarily innocuous as it
precludes certain types of punishment where ﬁrms price below cost (e.g., Abreu, 1988). See also footnote 9.
8The notation is deliberately sloppy here. Strictly speaking, c2 denotes D2’s input cost and not the price of an
upstream ﬁrm. We refrain from introducing extra notation for upstream ﬁrms’ actions as the (lowest) posted price
on the input market is always equal to D2’s cost.
7However, absent commitment, U1-D1 has an incentive to deviate in this situation (as empha-
sized by Hart and Tirole, 1990, and Reiﬀen, 1992). It will re-enter the input market, contrary to
its claim to withdraw, and undercut U2’s input price. As U2 will anticipate this deviation, the
static Nash equilibrium has both U1-D1 and U2 charging a price equal to marginal cost, that
is, c1 = c2 = 0 just as in the case without integration. U2 earns zero proﬁts and U1-D1 earns
π∗
D1(0,0) in the static Nash equilibrium. The following Proposition summarizes these ﬁndings.
Proposition 1 In the static game, the U1-D1 merger does not have any impact as the input
market is competitive both with and without the integration.
3 Repeated-game framework
Consider now the inﬁnitely repeated game. Time is indexed from t = 0,...,∞. Firms discount
future proﬁts with a common factor δ, where δ ∈ (0,1). When analyzing the repeated game,
denote by πc
i the proﬁt a ﬁrm earns when both ﬁrms adhere to collusion. We require πc
i to be
strictly larger than the proﬁt i makes in the static Nash equilibrium such that collusive equilibria
are individually rational. Let πd
i denote the proﬁt when ﬁrm i defects. π
p
i is the proﬁt when
punishment is triggered. We employ simple trigger strategies with reversion to the static Nash
equilibrium here.9
We look for collusive equilibria that are subgame perfect. In order to prevent defection in
period t = 0, the one-time gain from deviating today, πd
i − πc
i, must be weakly smaller than the
loss due to punishment, πc
i − π
p









; i = 1,2. (3)









:= δi; i = 1,2, (4)
where δi denotes the minimum discount factor required for ﬁrm i to adhere to collusion. In words,
whenever the actual discount factor, δ, is as least as high as the larger of the two minimum discount
9As demonstrated in Nocke and White (2007), using simple penal codes as an optimal punishment scheme (Abreu,
1988) actually fails in extensive-form games like this. The downstream ﬁrms will be involved in the most severe
punishment scheme and the punishment may depend on the identity and deviation price of the deviator.
8factors, collusion is feasible. We will sometimes also use δ = max{δ1,δ2} such that δ ≥ δ is required
for collusion.
When analyzing collusion, we will derive the collusive Nash equilibrium that requires the lowest
discount factor. As is common in this literature (Bernheim and Whinston, 1990; Compte et al.,
2002; Nocke and White, 2007), we assume that ﬁrms are able to set market shares in such a way
that δ is minimized.
4 Upstream collusion in the vertically separated industry
In the absence of vertical integration, it is straightforward to solve for the minimum discount
factor. There are two independent upstream ﬁrms, U1 and U2, and two downstream ﬁrms, D1
and D2. Both downstream ﬁrms purchase the input externally on the market. Suppose upstream
ﬁrms collude on some price for the input. Denoting this collusive input price by c, we obtain
c1 = c2 = c.
Let πcol denote total upstream industry proﬁt when collusion is successful, that is, πcol =
c(Q∗
1(c,c) + Q∗
2(c,c)). Let s ∈ [0,1] denote the market share U1 has in the input market. U1 and
U2 earn πc
1 = sπcol and πc
2 = (1 − s)πcol when colluding, respectively. When ﬁrm i defects, it
will earn πd
i = πcol by undercutting the collusive price c by a small amount. Nash reversions yield
π
p
i = 0 for both ﬁrms.
Let δUi denote the minimum discount factor required for Ui to adhere to collusion. Using (4),
the minimum discount factors required are
δU1 =
πcol − sπcol
πcol = 1 − s (5)
and
δU2 =
πcol − (1 − s)πcol
πcol = s. (6)
We have δU1 + δU2 = 1, and a symmetric division of the input market, s∗ = 1/2, minimizes
the discount factor required for collusion. We obtain the standard result that minimum discount
factors are
δU1 = δU2 = 1/2 (7)
when the industry is vertically separated.
9Proposition 2 In the vertically separated industry, upstream collusion can be supported as a sub-
game perfect Nash equilibrium if and only if δ ≥ 1/2.
As is well known, the minimum discount factor here does not depend on the level of collusive
proﬁts, πcol. Thus, ﬁrms may well choose c such as to maximize πcol as this requires the same
discount factor as any other collusive proﬁt.
5 Upstream collusion with U1-D1 integration
5.1 Preliminaries
We will now analyze the repeated game when U1 and D1 are vertically integrated but U2 and D2
are not. We will consider collusion at the upstream level, that is, an implicit agreement between
U1-D1 and U2. As above, let c2 denote the price of the input.
The nature of upstream collusion changes signiﬁcantly when one upstream ﬁrm is integrated.
In particular, U1-D1’s downstream price, p1, will be part of the collusion. This is by no means to
say that U1-D1 colludes with D2 at the downstream level. However, p1 aﬀects both the collusive
and the defection proﬁts of U1-D1 and U2 at the upstream level (more on this below). Therefore,
U1-D1 will take these eﬀects into account when setting p1, that is, the downstream price p1 will
be chosen to optimize the feasibility of upstream collusion.10 Note that, while a deviation from the
collusive downstream price only would trigger the punishment, this would not be rational as the
integrated ﬁrm would obtain strictly higher defection payoﬀs when it also deviates at the upstream
level.
As above in the analysis of the separated industry, market shares will be set such as to minimize
the incentives to deviate. Let s denote U1-D1’s market share in the input market and 1−s is U2’s
market share. Here, market shares refer to the external input market, with an output of Q2.11 By
contrast, with vertical separation, s and 1 − s refer to D1 and D2’s purchases, that is, Q1 + Q2.
10In Section 6.6, we will consider a special case where p1 is not collusive and where p1 = p∗
1 maximizes D1’s
short-run proﬁt instead.
11In the case of vertical integration, D2 only purchases the input externally on the market. However, theoretically,
D1 might want to purchase input from U2 as this is an eﬀective way for making side payments. This possibility,
considered below, would imply s∗ < 0.
105.2 Benchmarks
Before stating the results, we need some more notation and two useful benchmarks. In terms
of notation, whenever p1 is not equal to p∗
1(c1,c2), we cannot apply the Q∗
i(ci,cj) notation for
the downstream outputs anymore. In such cases, let Q1(p1,p2(c2)) and Q2(p2(c2),p1) denote
outputs in the sense that p2 will be the (myopic) best reply to p1 given c2, and p1 is the collusive
downstream price given c1 = 0 (which results from the assumption of zero marginal production
cost upstream). Using this notation, collusive proﬁts are p1Q1(p1,p2(c2)) + sc2Q2(p2(c2),p1) and
(1 − s)c2Q2(p2(c2),p1), for U1-D1 and U2, respectively.
The ﬁrst benchmark is the joint-proﬁt maximum of U1-D1 and U2. The joint maximum
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p1,c2






















The second benchmark is the price of the input that maximizes U2’s proﬁts if it is a monopolist
in the (external) input market and if U1-D1 plays its myopic best reply at the downstream level,
p∗
1(0,c2). Denote this price by cmon










2 ,0). This benchmark will be important when we analyze
U2’s defection proﬁts. The input-good price cmon
2 is also central to the static analysis of OSS
(1990).
5.3 Upstream collusion with U1-D1 integration: the main result
We now state the result on collusion when U1 and D1 are integrated and collude with U2 at the
upstream level. The complete proof can be found in Appendix A.





1 requires the lowest discount factor. If U1-D1 deviates from the collusive
upstream price it gets πjpm whereas U2 gets πmon
2 when it deviates.
11The Proposition indicates that collusion between U1-D1 and U2 is feasible if and only if the
joint-proﬁt maximum of U1-D1 and U2 (not to be confused with the industry proﬁt maximum)
can be sustained as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Coordinating on a collusive equilibrium
other than the joint-proﬁt maximum of U1-D1 and U2 is not worthwhile for ﬁrms as this requires a
higher discount factor and reduces their joint proﬁts. This result is stronger than the one obtained
with vertical separation where the joint-proﬁt maximum of U1 and U2 requires the same discount
factor as any other collusive equilibrium.
One implication of Proposition 3 is that a repeated-game equilibrium exists where D2’s costs
are supra-competitive. In other words, OSS (1990) raising-rival’s-costs strategy can be a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium in the repeated game. This result conﬁrms the informal arguments of
Riordan and Salop (1995) that OSS’ (1990) story can be saved from the Hart and Tirole (1990) and
Reiﬀen (1992) criticism with repeated interaction. Many other collusive Nash equilibria may exist
but the properties of the equilibrium in Proposition 3 (maximum proﬁts at the lowest minimum
discount factor) strengthen the case for the raising-rival’s-costs story.
As mentioned in the introduction, this interpretation of the result is not particularly intriguing
since we know from the Folk Theorem that many outcomes can be sustained as an equilibrium
in the inﬁnitely repeated game. Therefore, the comparison of the critical discount factor with
and without vertical integration (conducted in the next section) is crucial regarding the policy
implications of the analysis.
For the remainder of this section, a qualitative discussion of how upstream collusion in the
presence of an integrated ﬁrm works is provided (for formal details, see Appendix A). This con-
cerns mainly the understanding of U1-D1’s downstream price. There are two separate issues; the
collusive downstream price and the downstream price following an upstream deviation.
We start with the collusive downstream price, p1. This price is higher than the price a non-
integrated D1 would charge for two reasons. The ﬁrst reason is that the integrated U1-D1 sells a
positive amount of the input to D2. Even in a static game, this would imply higher downstream
prices (Chen, 2001). The intuition is as follows. When U1-D1 has a positive share in the external
input market, it earns money not only through its own downstream outlet but also by selling input
to D2. Therefore, U1-D1 faces a tradeoﬀ. Lowering p1 implies higher proﬁts for D1 but lower
sales for D2 and therefore lower upstream proﬁts. Put diﬀerently, while a separated D1 would set
p1 such that its marginal proﬁts are zero, the integrated U1-D1’s marginal proﬁts from selling to
12D2 are positive and thus U1-D1 will charge a correspondingly higher p1.
Chen (2001) was the ﬁrst to discover this anticompetitive eﬀect of vertical integration on
downstream prices. The market model in that paper is similar to the present one although Chen
analyzes a static game and allows for asymmetric upstream cost functions. Speciﬁcally, he analyzes
the possibility that downstream ﬁrms choose the upstream supplier from which they will purchase
the input before prices are set. In this case, vertical integration has a similar anticompetitive eﬀect
(see Chen’s Lemma 1) as in this model. When the integrated ﬁrm sells some of the input to D2 (at
a price higher than marginal cost), its incentives to compete at the downstream level are reduced
and, thus, downstream prices are higher. Chen (2001) shows that D2 may ﬁnd it worthwhile to
select the integrated ﬁrm as its supplier in that case.
As mentioned, U1-D1’s positive share in the input market would lead to increased downstream
prices even in the one-shot game (all else equal). In the repeated game, there is an additional eﬀect
which drives up the downstream prices further. In the static game, the integrated ﬁrm would choose







where s < 1. However, Proposition 3 indicates that p1 will be chosen to maximize the joint proﬁts






2 ),p1). In other words,
in the repeated game equilibrium characterized in Proposition 3, the integrated ﬁrm chooses p1 as
if it had a 100 percent market share upstream in a static game. Since the optimal p1 is increasing in
the market share the integrated ﬁrm has, the collusive eﬀect of vertical integration on downstream
prices is stronger in the repeated game.
Proposition 3 indicates that p1 is also aﬀected when an upstream ﬁrm defects. As U1-D1
operates at both industry levels, it can observe upstream deviations and can therefore respond
to them by charging a downstream price diﬀerent from the collusive one. No matter which ﬁrm
deviates, U1-D1 will always set its downstream price such that it maximizes its short run proﬁts
after a deviation. This is because, in the case of a deviation at the upstream level in period t, the
punishment will be triggered in t + 1 regardless of the downstream price U1-D1 charges in t and,
thus, sequential rationality implies myopic proﬁt maximization in t. However, U1-D1’s downstream
price following a defection will diﬀer depending on whether U1-D1 or U2 was the defector. If U1-D1
itself deviates at the upstream level, U1-D1 will capture the entire upstream proﬁt in addition to
its downstream proﬁt and U2 earns nothing. Thus, U1-D1’s optimal downstream price maximizes
the sum of upstream proﬁts and D1’s proﬁt. If U2 is the deviator at the upstream level, U1-D1
13does not gain any upstream proﬁt; only D1 earns money. Hence, U1-D1’s optimal downstream
price will maximize D1’s proﬁt. Indeed, it is straightforward to see that U1-D1 will choose the
short-run best response to D2’s price given c2, that is p∗
1(c2), in this case. This reduces U2’s
defection proﬁts. These arguments illustrate that U1-D1’s downstream price has a strong impact
on the proﬁtability of upstream deviations. (See also the discussion of the reaction eﬀect below.)
The logic of downstream pricing after a defection also explains why U1-D1 and U2 should
coordinate on the joint-proﬁt maximum in order to minimize the discount factor required for
collusion. If there is an upstream deviation (no matter whether U1-D1 or U2 is the deviator),
U1-D1 will set a downstream price that does not depend on the original collusive downstream
price. That is, the defection proﬁts do not depend on the collusive downstream price either. Thus,
ﬁrms should maximize collusive proﬁts as far as possible in order to minimize the critical discount
factor. A similar argument can be made regarding the collusive upstream price (see Appendix A).
5.4 The minimum discount factor
Collusion as described in Proposition 3 implies the following for the minimum discount factor when





















D1(0,0) is the punishment proﬁt. For U2, (3) reads
πmon












as U2’s punishment proﬁt is zero. Adding up these incentive constraints, we obtain that collusion

























1 ), we obtain the counterpart to Propo-
sition 2:
Proposition 4 When U1 and D1 are vertically integrated, collusion can be supported as a subgame





2 + πjpm − π∗
D1(0,0)
.
14Underlying Proposition 4 is the assumption that ﬁrms choose market shares such that the joint
incentives to deviate are minimized. When the actual discount factor is higher than the threshold
in Proposition 4, diﬀerent markets shares become feasible. When the actual discount factor is
equal to the threshold, we can substitute δ = πmon
2 /(πmon
2 + πjpm − π∗
D1(0,0)) back into either



















2 + πjpm − π∗
D1(0,0))
. (13)






holds with linear demand (see Appendix B). If a case can be made for s∗ < 0 (which the general
model does allow for), this would amount to side payments from U1-D1 to U2.
6 The impact of vertical integration in a separated industry
6.1 Vertical integration facilitates upstream collusion
We now turn to a key point of the analysis, the comparison of the minimum discount factor with
and without vertical integration. From Proposition 2, we know that collusion can be supported as a
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the separated industry if and only if δ ≥ 1/2. Comparing this
constraint to the threshold in Proposition 4, collusion after the U1-D1 merger requires a discount
factor smaller than 1/2 if and only if
πmon
2 < πjpm − π∗
D1(0,0). (14)





2 ,0) ≤ πjpm, where the strict
inequality is due to the raising-rival’s-costs eﬀect (2) and the weak inequality follows by deﬁnition.
Proposition 5 The U1-D1 merger facilitates upstream collusion.
When U1 and D1 are integrated, collusion can be sustained as a subgame perfect Nash equilib-
rium for strictly lower discount factors compared to the δ = 1/2 benchmark of vertical separation.
15That is, in a vertical non-integrated industry, a vertical merger would facilitate collusion. Propo-
sition 1 states that the vertical merger does not have any impact in the static game. By contrast,
Proposition 5 shows that it does have an anticompetitive eﬀect in the repeated game.
6.2 Discussion and comparison with Nocke and White (2007)
Nocke and White (2007) ﬁnd a result identical to Proposition 5 for the case of two-part tariﬀs.
Even though the main ﬁndings of Nocke and White and this paper are the same regardless of
the contractual arrangements, there are several diﬀerences. This section discusses some of these
diﬀerences. Nocke and White identify several eﬀects of the vertical merger on upstream collusion.
This section also contains a discussion of these eﬀects.
Nocke and White essentially proceed as follows. Because there are two-part tariﬀs in their
model, the upstream ﬁrms can earn maximum industry proﬁts both with and without the vertical
integration (provided the discount factor is suﬃciently high). The upstream ﬁrms charge a whole-
sale price per unit for the input such that it is a best reply for the downstream ﬁrms to charge
industry-proﬁt-maximizing prices, and the proﬁt the downstream ﬁrms make is then transferred
back to the upstream ﬁrms with the help of the ﬁxed fee. The industry-proﬁt-maximizing prices
(upstream and downstream) are, of course, the same either with or without the vertical merger,
and the downstream market is symmetric in both cases.
With linear contracts, the analysis is somewhat diﬀerent. To begin with, the colluding upstream
ﬁrms can never earn maximum industry proﬁts because there will be double marginalization for
at least one downstream ﬁrm. More importantly, when U1 and D1 are integrated, D1 obtains
the input at marginal costs but D2 pays a price above marginal cost. When upstream collusion
is successful in the separated industry, both downstream ﬁrms pay a price above marginal cost.
It follows that prices and proﬁts are diﬀerent in the two cases. Also, the downstream segment is
asymmetric because of the raising-rivals’-costs eﬀect when U1 and D1 are integrated, whereas, in
the case of vertical separation, there is symmetry at the downstream level.
A ﬁrst consequence of these diﬀerences is that, even though the main result is the same in both
papers (the U1-D1 merger facilitates collusion), there is a subtle diﬀerence in the interpretation of
the result. Because the colluding upstream ﬁrms may earn maximum industry proﬁts both with
and without the vertical merger, Nocke and White can focus on a ceteris paribus comparison of
the critical discount factor required to sustain the industry proﬁt maximum. Their main result
16(Proposition 1) means that the critical discount factor required to sustain the industry proﬁt
maximum is lower when one upstream ﬁrm is vertically integrated. In this paper, proﬁts diﬀer
depending on whether or not U1 and D1 are integrated. Thus the comparison of discount factors
cannot be made for equal proﬁts. Here, the analysis focusses on the collusive equilibrium that
requires the lowest discount factor in either case. The interpretation of the main result of this
paper is that there exists a range of discount factors where the vertically integrated industry is
collusive but the separated industry is not.
The diﬀerences between linear and two-part tariﬀs are also important when it comes to the
various eﬀects of vertical mergers on upstream collusion Nocke and White identify. Nocke and
White show how ﬁrms in an unintegrated industry are aﬀected by the U1-D1 merger, depending
on whether they will be the integrated ﬁrm after the merger has taken place. To do this, they
ﬁx the share of the (symmetric) industry proﬁt maximum each ﬁrm has and then check how the
vertical merger changes the incentive constraint (3), provided that exactly the same outcome (in
terms prices and shares of the proﬁts) are realized after the merger. As already noted, we need to
analyze the impact of vertical integration by comparing across diﬀerent outcomes in this paper.
Moreover, we need new notation for shares of the collusive proﬁts here because markets shares in
the external input market, s, and shares of the collusive proﬁt diﬀer. D1’s proﬁt is part of the
collusive proﬁt, but it cannot be transferred to U2 (neither in equilibrium nor in the case of a
U2 deviation).12 By contrast, in the separated industry, market shares and shares of the collusive
proﬁts are identical (see Section 4), as in Nocke and White.
Therefore, we introduce the variable r which denotes U1-D1’s share of the collusive proﬁt, and






















The r variable allows us to investigate the eﬀects of the vertical integration as in Nocke and





> 1 − r (16)
12Even if we allow D1 to procure from U2 (which, as noted above, amounts to allowing side payments) and even
if, in addition, we deﬁne market shares such that they include both the external input market plus the internal
U1-D1 transfer, these redeﬁned input market shares still do not directly correspond to shares of the collusive proﬁts
because of the downstream asymmetry. One unit of input sold by D2 yields a collusive proﬁt of c2 whereas one sold
by D1 yields p1.
17where the inequality is due to π∗
D1(0,0) > 0 and where 1 − r (= 1 − s) is the benchmark of
the separated industry (see (5)). That is, when we compare a separated and an integrated ﬁrm
which get an identical share of the collusive industry proﬁts, r, the minimum discount factor
for the integrated ﬁrm is higher. Nocke and White (2007) call this the punishment eﬀect. The
punishment eﬀect occurs because the integrated ﬁrm makes a positive proﬁt in the static Nash
equilibrium (π∗
D1(0,0) > 0) whereas a non-integrated ﬁrm makes no proﬁt in the static Nash
equilibrium. As in Nocke and White (2007), the punishment is less harsh for an integrated ﬁrm
which, all else equal, makes collusion more diﬃcult to sustain.
For U2, equation (4), the condition for collusion to be feasible, becomes
δU2 =
πmon




where the inequality is due to πmon
2 < πjpm and where r (= s) is the benchmark of the separated
industry (see (6)). There are two eﬀects here, both of which can also be found in Nocke and White
(2007).
The outlets eﬀect arises from the fact that the non-integrated upstream ﬁrm cannot sell to
the downstream aﬃliate of the integrated rival when deviating. Speciﬁcally, D1’s proﬁt is part of
the collusive proﬁt but it cannot be seized by U2 through a deviation.13 This eﬀectively curbs
U2’s deviation proﬁts compared to the separated industry where U2 can obtain 100 percent of the
collusive proﬁts when deviating. All else equal, lower deviation proﬁts imply a lower minimum
discount factor.
The reaction eﬀect arises because U1-D1 can observe if U2 deviates at the upstream level and
can adapt its downstream price accordingly (see also the analysis of downstream pricing in Lemma
1 in Appendix A). The reaction eﬀect reduces U2’s deviation proﬁts compared to the separated case
where downstream pricing is unaﬀected by upstream deviations. This implies a further reduction
of the minimum discount factor.14
13U2 cannot sell to D1 in equilibrium either (by assumption), but crucial for the outlets eﬀect is that D1 would
never buy from U2 after a U2 deviation.
14One can hypothetically isolate the outlets eﬀect from the reaction eﬀect by assuming that downstream ﬁrms



























δU2 < r. That is, even if there was no reaction eﬀect, the outlets eﬀect alone would reduce the minimum discount
factor (as in Nocke and White, 2007). Another scenario where no reaction eﬀect can occur is when downstream
ﬁrms always charge the static Nash prices, regardless of the industry structure and nature of upstream competition.
This scenario is analyzed in Section 6.6.
18The net impact of the punishment, the outlets and reaction eﬀect is positive—otherwise, we
would not have obtained the result that vertical integration facilitates collusion (Proposition 5).
In other words, writing down the incentive constraints (3) with the help of the shares of collusive
proﬁts, r, and adding them up yields the constraint in Proposition 4 again.
Nocke and White (2007) also identify a lack-of-commitment eﬀect. This eﬀect does not occur in
this model and it is easy to see why. In Nocke and White (2007), downstream prices are such that
they maximize industry proﬁts (that is, the sum U1-D1, U2 and D2’s proﬁts) when U1-D1 and
U2 successfully collude. If the integrated ﬁrm deviates, however, it will choose a downstream price
that maximizes its own proﬁts and will thus choose a more competitive price at the downstream
level. This will be anticipated by D2 and thus U1-D1 cannot obtain maximum industry proﬁts
when deviating. This is the lack-of-commitment eﬀect. In this model, the eﬀect does not occur
because upstream ﬁrms charge a linear price for the input and D2 makes a positive proﬁt (which
is not part of the collusive proﬁts). U1-D1 and U2 do not collude by maximizing industry proﬁts.
Instead, they collude by maximizing the joint proﬁts of U1-D1 and U2. When U1-D1 deviates,
U2’s proﬁt is zero and the entire upstream proﬁt goes to U1-D1. Thus U1-D1 will set the same
downstream price after it deviates and thus there is no lack-of-commitment eﬀect.
Finally, Nocke and White (2007) suggest a market share motive for vertical merger. The logic
behind this motive is that the integrated ﬁrm has an incentive to cheat unless it gets a market
share larger than a symmetric division of the market implies. In a market without integration,
the symmetric division of the market minimizes the critical discount factor. Thus, by vertically
merging, the integrated ﬁrm can ensure itself a bigger market because otherwise collusion might
break down. In the model of this paper, the integrated ﬁrm has a bigger market share, too. Because
of the raising-rival’s-costs eﬀect and ex-ante symmetry, D1 will always sell more than D2. Thus,
even in the case where U1-D1 does not sell any input at all on the external input market (s = 0),
its overall market share including externally traded input and internal U1-D1 transfer (that is,
Q1/(Q1 + Q2)) will be larger than a symmetric division of the market would suggest.
6.3 Example with linear demand
In order to illustrate some of the results derived above, consider the following parameterized version
of the model, also used in OSS (1990), as an example. Demand is assumed to be linear, symmetric
19and the demand intercept is, without loss of generality, normalized to one
Qi(pi,pj) = 1 − bpi + d(pj − pi), i,j,= 1,2;i 6= j, (18)
where b,d ≥ 0. It simpliﬁes the analysis to rewrite this as
Qi(pi,pj) = 1 − kpi + dpj, i,j,= 1,2;i 6= j, (19)
where k = b+d. Products are entirely independent if d = 0 whereas d → ∞ would imply perfectly
homogenous goods. Di’s proﬁt is
πDi = (1 − kpi + dpj)(pi − ci), i,j,= 1,2;i 6= j. (20)




1 , the corresponding proﬁt expressions and
the minimum discount factors can be found. Appendix B also shows how s is used to relax the













Figure 1. U1-D1’s optimal market share, s*, and the resulting minimum discount 
factor, δ, as a function of the degree of product differentiation, d (where k = d + 1 is
w.l.o.g. regarding the qualitative properties of the figure.)  
Using the closed-form solutions derived from the linear-demand model, Figure 1 plots s∗ and
the resulting minimum discount factor δ = max{δU1−D1,δU2} as a function of the parameter
20of product diﬀerentiation, d, where δU1−D1 = δU2 = δ if and only if s = s∗. We make three
observations
– The Figure illustrates that the reduction of the minimum discount factor can be quantita-
tively substantial. δ decreases monotonically in d. Using the algebra in Appendix B, we can
also take limd→∞ . In that case, we obtain s = 1 and δ = 0. With vertical separation, the
minimum discount factor required for collusion is 1/2 regardless of the degree of product
diﬀerentiation.
– s∗ is non-monotonic in the parameter of product diﬀerentiation, d, and has a minimum
smaller than 1/2.
– If d = 0, we have s = δ = 1/2. This is intuitive because, when products are entirely indepen-
dent, raising D2’s cost does not improve D1’s proﬁt and so ﬁrms face the same incentives as
in the separated industry.
6.4 Extension to bilateral oligopoly
It is relatively straightforward to see that Proposition 5 also holds with more than two upstream
ﬁrms. Suppose there are n > 2 upstream ﬁrms, one of which is vertically integrated, say U1-D1.
The prices that maximize the joint-proﬁts of the colluding ﬁrms (U1-D1, U2, ..., Un) do not change





the joint proﬁts as in Proposition 5 for the duopoly case. What does change with n > 2 is that the
proﬁt made in the input market is divided among more ﬁrms, so collusion will generally be more
diﬃcult. But, as we will see, collusion will still require a lower discount factor when one ﬁrm is
vertically integrated.
In the separated industry, a symmetric division of the market minimizes the critical discount
factor. In that case, each upstream ﬁrm has a minimum discount factor of δUi = (n − 1)/n,
i = 1,...,n.
When U1 and D1 are vertically integrated, assume as above that the integrated ﬁrm has a
market share of s and the n−1 non-integrated ﬁrms symmetrically split the rest so that each has


































































Comparing this constraint to the threshold obtained with vertical separation, (n − 1)/n, collusion
requires a discount factor lower if and only if πmon
2 < πjpm−π∗
D1(0,0). We know from the analysis
of the duopoly case that this condition holds (see (14)). Thus, vertical integration facilitates
collusion also with n > 2 upstream ﬁrms.
The results do not change qualitatively either when there are m > 2 downstream ﬁrms. To
begin with, note that raising one downstream ﬁrm’s cost has similar qualitative eﬀects to raising
two or more downstream ﬁrms’ costs. Further, what matters are the market shares s and 1 − s
the upstream ﬁrms have in the input market. For m = 2, industry proﬁts in the external input
market are c(Q1+Q2) and c2Q2 with vertical separation and integration, respectively. This can be
extended for Q3,...,Qm for the m > 2 case. Because the downstream markets are symmetric, we
have Q2 = Q3 = ... = Qm. Thus, some ˜ Q = (m−1)Q2 can be thought of as representing the sales
of all non-integrated downstream ﬁrms. But when using the ˜ Q aggregate measure, the analysis is
the same as the analysis of downstream duopoly above. Whether it is one or more non-integrated
downstream ﬁrms purchasing on the input market is therefore immaterial and, thus, does not
change the results qualitatively.15
6.5 Welfare
This Section discusses the welfare implications of the results. To prepare the welfare analysis, it
is useful to make the notion that vertical integration facilitates collusion more precise. A collusive
15It is not possible to make a statement about the quantitative eﬀects of having m > 2 downstream ﬁrms
without making further speciﬁc modeling assumptions. It does seem intuitive, though, that the larger the number
of downstream ﬁrms, the more signiﬁcant the upstream collusive proﬁt c2 ˜ Q will be compared to the collusive
downstream proﬁt, πD1. Nevertheless, the punishment, outlets and reaction eﬀect will be present even when πD1
is negligible compared to the upstream collusive proﬁt.
22eﬀect of the U1-D1 merger occurs for an intermediate range of minimum discount factors. For
low values of δ (precisely, for δ < δ < 1/2), neither the integrated nor the separated industry is
collusive. For δ ≥ 1/2, both the integrated and non-integrated structure will be collusive. It is for
the range of intermediate discount factors δ ≤ δ < 1/2 where the industry is collusive only with
the U1-D1 merger, but not when ﬁrms are vertically separated. If ﬁrms’ actual discount factor is
in this range, vertical integration will cause an increase of the input price.
This does, however, not imply that vertical integration is unambiguously bad for welfare. Eco-
nomic welfare will not be aﬀected in the case of low discount factors, and it will be aﬀected
negatively by a vertical merger in the intermediate case where only the integrated industry is col-
lusive. However, in the case where both separated and integrated industries are collusive, vertical
integration may also have positive welfare eﬀects. With integration, only the non-integrated down-
stream ﬁrm pays a collusive price for the input, whereas the integrated downstream ﬁrm receives
the input internally (and eﬃciently) at marginal cost. Without the vertical merger, both down-
stream ﬁrms pay a collusive input price above marginal cost. As vertical integration implies that
the double markup for the integrated downstream ﬁrm is eliminated, the welfare balance of vertical
integration might be positive if both separated and integrated industries are collusive. Thus, the
overall the welfare eﬀects of vertical integration are ambiguous. This is in contrast to Nocke and
White’s (2007) analysis where the vertical merger implies a negative change in welfare.
Proposition 6 The welfare eﬀects of the U1-D1 merger are ambiguous.
The linear demand example can be used to illustrate some welfare-related issues for the δ ≥ 1/2
case when collusion is feasible in either case. With linear demand, we can contrast the equilibrium
described in Proposition 3 to the scenario where separated upstream ﬁrms maximize their joint
proﬁts. Compared to the collusive separated industry, collusion with a single ﬁrm integrated
causes a lower price for the input.16 That is, D2 purchases the input at a lower price with vertical
integration and the eﬀective price for D1 is c1 = 0 with U1-D1 integration anyway. This shows
how vertical integration may improve welfare.
16Using the closed-form solutions for downstream outputs in (47), the upstream proﬁts of vertically separated
ﬁrms are 2ck(1 − c(k − d))/(2k − d) if c1 = c2 = c. The price maximizing this proﬁt is c = 1/(2(k − d)). It is easy
to show that this price is larger than c
jpm
2 as in (39).
23A second point which can be illustrated with the linear demand when δ ≥ 1/2. Suppose the
separated U1 and U2 collude successfully. By merging, U1-D1 and U2 can increase their joint
proﬁt. However, U2’s stand-alone proﬁt decreases when U1 and D1 merge. This is the case even
with s = 0 where U2 gets 100% of the upstream proﬁt.17 That is, absent side payments, U2 strictly
loses from the vertical merger. Thus, when successful collusion of the separated industry is the
status quo, U2 would not support the U1-D1 merger. It is diﬃcult to see how U2 would peacefully
agree to price agreements following a merger that reduces its proﬁts strictly (for example, U2 might
threat to commit itself to competitive pricing if the vertical merger is carried out). This result
may indicate that a U1-D1 merger is unlikely to occur when δ ≥ 1/2. In turn, this would imply
that, if U1 and D1 merge, the vertical integration is likely to be anti-competitive.
6.6 D1 as a proﬁt center
In this Section, we will analyze the special case where the downstream price of the integrated ﬁrm,
p1, maximizes the short-run proﬁts of D1 rather than U1-D1’s proﬁts or U1-D1 and U2’s joint
proﬁts. We know from Proposition 3 that such behavior is not optimal and thus must increase
the critical discount factor. However, myopic proﬁt-maximizing behavior is plausible when D1
operates as a proﬁt center. Beyond any interest in the speciﬁc proﬁt center case (see, e.g., Radner
and Ichiishi, 1999), a general motivation for this analysis is that downstream pricing will be exactly
as in the static model of OSS (1990) under this assumption. That is, we can analyze the behavior
of the upstream ﬁrms in the repeated game given the same downstream Nash prices as in the static
game. Thus, this exercise can add further insight how vertical mergers change the incentives for
competition in the input market.
For the ease of presentation, assume further that U1-D1 and U2 charge the monopoly price in
(9) for the input.18 As above, D1 obtains the input at marginal cost c1 = 0. That is, we have
c2 = cmon
2 , p1 = p∗
1(0,cmon
2 ) and p2 = p∗
2(cmon
2 ,0) throughout Section 6.6.
Under these assumptions, we analyze the incentives for collusion again. Consider collusive
proﬁts, πc
i, ﬁrst. At the upstream level, U1-D1 makes a proﬁt of sπmon. At the downstream level,
17With c = 1/(2(k−d)), the resulting maximum upstream proﬁt of the separated U1 and U2 is k/(2(2k−d)(k−d)).




2 . Thus, even if s = 0 after the merger,
U2 strictly loses proﬁts from the merger.
18A previous version of the paper, Normann (2004), treats the proﬁt center case more extensively. The assumption
c2 = cmon
2 is without loss of generality in that, for part (i) of Proposition below to hold, it is suﬃcient to show that
it holds for one level of c2. Part (ii) generally holds for any level of c2.
24U1-D1 makes a proﬁt of π∗
D1(0,cmon
2 ). Therefore, πc
1 = sπmon+π∗
D1(0,cmon
2 ). U2 makes a collusive
proﬁt of πc
2 = (1−s)πmon. When defecting, either ﬁrm will undercut cmon
2 by an inﬁnitesimally small
margin and will obtain πmon in the period of defection. It follows that πd
















2 ) − π∗
D1(0,0)
< 1 − s, (24)
where the inequality is due to π∗
D1(0,cmon
2 ) − π∗
D1(0,0) > 0, and
δU2 =
πmon − (1 − s)πmon
πmon = s. (25)
We obtain δ1 + δ2 < 1. Therefore, suitable values of s push both minimum discount factors below
1/2.
We conclude that collusion when U1 and D1 are integrated also requires a lower discount factor
than upstream collusion with vertical separation when we impose the above assumptions. That is,
even when D1 operates as a proﬁt center and when it is thus not involved in the collusion, we still
obtain the crucial result that vertical integration facilitates collusion. The reaction eﬀect discussed
above cannot occur in this case and is therefore not necessary to obtain the main result. Nocke
and White (2007) also note that their main result does not require a reaction eﬀect.
The proﬁt center assumption also helps to clarify another important issue. In OSS (1990),
vertical mergers are connected with a notion of foreclosure. The integrated ﬁrm is supposed to
withdraw from the input market.19 By contrast, the integrated ﬁrm is active in the input market
in the present model. Moreover, Figure 1 shows that U1-D1’s market share is always positive and
can be even larger than 50%. That is, the analysis so far has not been supportive of OSS’ (1990)
idea of foreclosure.
If D1 is a proﬁt center, the case for foreclosure in OSS’ (1990) sense is stronger. We can
interpret the market share of the integrated ﬁrm, s, as an indicator of foreclosure in that s = 0
would correspond to the case where U1-D1 completely withdraws from the input market. Similarly,
market outcomes with s < 1/2 can be interpreted as a partial “withdrawal” because U1-D1’s
19OSS’ (1990) notion of foreclosure diﬀers from the one by Rey and Tirole (2007) who deﬁne foreclosure more
broadly as the denial of complete access of downstream competitors to the input good.
25market share is less than a symmetric division of the market would suggest.20
Bearing this notion of foreclosure in mind, it is easy to see that s < 1/2 is actually crucial
when U1 and D1 are integrated and given the proﬁt center assumption. (Recall that the market
shares s and −1s refer to the external market.) We have δU1−D1 < 1 − s and δU2 = s in (16) and
(17). It follows that, s < 1/2 is a necessary condition when ﬁrms look for the collusive equilibrium
with the lowest discount factor. Given the proﬁt center assumption, the vertical merger facilitates
collusion if and only if s < 1/2 because s > 1/2 would imply δ2 > 1/2.21 We summarize:
Proposition 7 Assuming c2 = cmon
2 and p1 = p∗
1(0,cmon
2 ), we obtain the following results. (i)
The U1-D1 merger facilitates collusion. (ii) With U1-D1 integration, foreclosure (s < 1/2) is
necessary to obtain a minimum discount factor of less than 1/2.
7 Alternative scenarios
7.1 U2-D2 Counter merger
OSS (1990) argue that U2 and D2 have an incentive for counter merger after U1 and D1 integrate.
They show that U2 and D2 can increase their joint proﬁts by vertically integrating (and, in turn,
supplying D2 internally at marginal cost) compared to the case where U2 charges the monopoly
price for the input. This implies U1-D1 has to limit the price of the input below U2’s monopoly
price in order to prevent the counter merger from happening. One of OSS’ (1990) key results is
that the counter merger can always be prevented in this manner since the joint proﬁts of U2 and
D2 turn out to be higher for some small positive value of c2 compared to their joint proﬁts after the
vertical merger. Formally, the highest price that will deter the counter merger is implicitly deﬁned
by c∗
2 := {c2 | π∗
D2(c2,0) + c2Q∗
2(c2,0) = π∗
D2(0,0)} (see OSS, 1990, p. 141). We need to check
whether the U1-D1 merger may provoke a counter merger in a similar way in the repeated-game
setting of this paper. As in OSS (1990), it is useful to apply the parameterized model with linear
demand here.
20While it can be observed whether or not U1-D1 has a market share in the external input market of less than 50
percent after the merger, it depends on the pre-merger market shares whether this implies a decrease or an increase
of U1-D1’s market share. Thus, observed changes in market share may not unambiguously identify foreclosure.
21This condition is not restricted to the c2 = cmon
2 case; it is a general requirement. It is straightforward to see
that c2 = cmon
2 minimizes δ2 for any s. Thus, we obtain δ2 ≥ δ2|c=cmon
2 = s and therefore δ2 < 1/2 only if s < 1/2.
26Assuming there is a counter-merger threat in the setup of this paper, one thing to check is




1 , together with the optimal market
shares (s∗, 1 − s∗) are suitable to prevent the counter merger. It turns out that this is not the
case. At the joint-proﬁt-maximizing prices, the counter merger does pay (see Appendix C). Thus,
the collusive equilibrium that minimizes the critical discount factor is not tenable when U2 and
D2 can merge.
A second step would be to ask whether the counter merger can be prevented at all. Here, the
answer is aﬃrmative and this is hardly surprising given that OSS (1990) have shown this result
already in the static game (and for a scenario corresponding to s = 0 and p1 = p∗
1). Indeed, the
incentive for counter merger is weaker in this model than in OSS (1990) as U1-D1 charges a higher
downstream price than in the static game. All else equal, this raises D2’s and U2’s proﬁts and
thus makes the U2-D2 merger less attractive. As an example, Appendix C shows that c2 = c∗
2 (the
input price OSS (1990) derive for the static game) and an appropriately chosen s will prevent the
counter merger.
Taking these two results together, it follows that setting prices and market shares in order to
prevent the counter merger comes at a cost. The proﬁtability of collusion declines as the input
price possibly has to be set below c
jpm
2 , and if prices and market shares are not set as in Proposition
3 the minimum discount factor will also increase. While it is not possible to solve explicitly for the
collusive equilibrium that minimizes the critical discount factor and prevents the counter merger,
one can derive examples where the minimum discount factor is below the threshold of 1/2 and
no incentive for counter merger exists. Generally, the counter merger is beneﬁcial from a welfare
perspective.
7.2 Downstream collusion
So far, the analysis has been on upstream collusion, but there may also be the possibility of
downstream collusion. If downstream collusion is possible, this could challenge the above results.
Possibly, D1 prefers to collude with D2 and thus would not want to merge with U1.
Appendix D analyzes downstream collusion with linear demand (see, for example, Deneckere,
1983). Two results derive from this example. First, downstream ﬁrms can largely eliminate the
temptation to deviate. More precisely, by choosing collusive prices close to static Nash equilibrium
prices, D1 and D2 can lower the minimum discount factor required for collusion arbitrarily close to
27zero. The intuition is that deviation proﬁts increase more quickly in the collusive prices than the
corresponding collusive proﬁt, so higher collusive prices require a higher minimum discount factor.
When prices are close to the static Nash level, the incentive to deviate is negligible. This implies
that some downstream collusion is always feasible, no matter how low the actual discount factor
is. This is an advantage compared to upstream collusion after the U1-D1 merger which requires
a strictly positive minimum discount factor (as it is not an equilibrium in the static game). The
second result is that downstream collusion can yield maximum industry proﬁts, provided there
is upstream competition (such that c1 = c2 = 0) and the discount factor is suﬃciently high.
This is not possible with upstream collusion, either with or without vertical integration, as there
will always be double marginalization for at least one ﬁrm. Thus, downstream collusion seems
advantageous as it works even with rather low discount factors and it must eventually yield higher
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Figure 2. Industry profits as a function of the discount factor for three collusion 
scenarios: upstream collusion with vertical separation (U1 U2), upstream collusion 
with vertical integration (U1-D1 U2) and downstream collusion (D1 D2). The 
example is based on the linear demand model, k = d + 1 and d = 3. In the static Nash 






However, the analysis of the linear demand model also shows that upstream collusion, when
one ﬁrm is vertically integrated, may be more eﬀective than downstream collusion, in the sense
of yielding higher proﬁts for comparable minimum discount factors. This is the case for certain
28degrees of product diﬀerentiation and some intermediate level of discount factors as illustrated
in Figure 2. The Figure plots industry proﬁts as a function of the discount factor for three
collusion scenarios; upstream collusion of vertically separated ﬁrms (“U1 U2”), upstream collusion
when U1-D1 are integrated (“U1-D1 U2”), and downstream collusion of vertically separated ﬁrms
(“D1 D2”).22 In all three cases, industry proﬁts are 0.32 if the discount factor is zero (this is
the static Nash proﬁt of the two downstream ﬁrms in this example; the upstream ﬁrms make a
static Nash proﬁt of zero). Higher discount factors make collusion and therefore higher proﬁts
feasible. From the analysis above, we know about the two cases of upstream collusion. Upstream
collusion with vertical separation (U1 U2) is feasible only if δ ≥ 1/2. In that case, industry proﬁts
increase from 0.32 to 0.48. Upstream collusion with vertical integration (U1-D1 U2) requires a
discount factor of 0.23 in the example, and if δ ≥ 0.23 industry proﬁts of 0.49 result. Finally,
with downstream collusion (D1 D2) (where ﬁrms are assumed to get the input at marginal cost),
proﬁts monotonically increase in δ until, with a discount factor of larger than 0.61, the maximum
industry proﬁt of 0.5 results.
For δ ∈ [0.23,0.49], upstream collusion after the U1-D1 merger yields higher industry proﬁts
than downstream collusion. Importantly, not only are industry proﬁts higher when U1-D1 and
U2 collude, but the joint proﬁts of the colluding ﬁrms (U1-D1 U2) are also higher compared to
D1-D2 collusion. This is perhaps not surprising, as D1’s proﬁt is increased at D2’s expense, but
this has an important implication. The result implies that U1 and D1 may have an incentive
to merge even when downstream collusion is an option.23 In the example, this is the case when
δ ∈ [0.23,0.49]. The general conclusion is that the possibility of downstream collusion does not
eliminate the incentive for vertical integration.24
22The Figure plots industry proﬁts (the proﬁts of U1, U2, D1 and D2) in all cases for the sake of comparability.
While higher industry proﬁts do not guarantee that the industry structure yielding those proﬁts will also emerge
endogenously from merger decisions (and vice versa), they are nevertheless a useful indicator. It is beyond the scope
of this paper to present a model of endogenous mergers.
23As an aside, note that when collusion is feasible at both upstream and downstream level, the integrated ﬁrm
can choose at which level it prefers to collude, as it is always free to deny cooperation at one level and (tacitly)
agree to cooperate at the other level.
24In contrast to the example in Figure 2, there are also cases where downstream collusion is more eﬀective than
upstream collusion with vertical integration. For example, when products are rather heterogenous, downstream
collusion amounts to two nearly independent monopolies and thus yields almost maximum industry proﬁts even
with very low discount factors. By contrast, upstream collusion with vertical integration cannot yield maximum
industry proﬁts because of the double markup.
298 Conclusion
This paper analyzes upstream collusion in the presence of a vertically integrated ﬁrm when down-
stream ﬁrms pay a linear price for the input. In the model, the downstream unit of the integrated
ﬁrm beneﬁts from a raising-rivals’-costs eﬀect when the input market is collusive. While this
raising-rivals’-costs strategy (OSS, 1990) is not an equilibrium in the static game (Hart and Tirole,
1990; Reiﬀen, 1992), this paper shows that it is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the repeated
game.
A central result of the paper is that, in a separated industry, a single vertical merger facilitates
upstream collusion, that is, it causes a reduction of the minimum discount factor required for
collusion. Thus, ﬁrms have an incentive for anticompetitive vertical merger. This complements
the analysis of Nocke and White (2007) who prove the same result in a model with two-part tariﬀs.
Interestingly, the eﬀects underlying this result (punishment, outlets and reaction eﬀect) turn out
to be work rather similarly with linear prices and two-part tariﬀs. In contrast to the two-part
tariﬀs model, however, the overall welfare balance of vertical integration is not necessarily negative
with linear tariﬀs. The integrated ﬁrm delivers its downstream unit at marginal cost, and this
elimination of a double markup can imply a welfare gain compared to the case where vertically
separated ﬁrms collude. Alternative scenarios, including counter merger and downstream collusion,
do not generally eliminate the incentive for vertical merger.
The paper further adds to the foreclosure debate (see, e.g., Riordan, 2008). When upstream
ﬁrms successfully collude, they reduce demand as a function of the price. This would be foreclosure
in the broad deﬁnition of Rey and Tirole (2007). They deﬁne any case where downstream ﬁrms
have incomplete access to the input good as foreclosure. OSS (1990) suggest a more speciﬁc notion
of foreclosure where the integrated ﬁrm withdraws from the input market. In the model of this
paper, the integrated ﬁrm is active in the input market and its market share is always positive (in
an example with linear demand, the market share can even plausibly be above 50%), so this result
does not support OSS’ (1990) idea of foreclosure. When the downstream unit of the integrated
ﬁrm operates as a proﬁt center, the case for OSS-type foreclosure is stronger. In this case, the
market share of the integrated ﬁrm is less than a symmetric market division would suggest. Thus,
there is at least partial foreclosure.
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Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 3
The following additional notation will be used throughout Appendix A. We need the downstream
price that maximizes the joint proﬁts of U1-D1 and U2 for some given c2. Formally,
b p1(c2) := argmax
p1
p1Q1(p1,p2(c2)) + c2Q2(p2(c2),p1). (26)




2 in (8) relate to b p1 in that p
jpm
1 = b p1(c
jpm
2 ). The
proof of Proposition 3 is established in six steps.
Step 1: Best downstream response after an upstream deviation. When a ﬁrm deviates from the
collusive upstream price, c2, U1-D1 can respond to the deviation by charging a downstream price
diﬀerent from the collusive one. This is possible because either U1-D1 is the deviator itself or, if
U2 defects, U1-D1 can observe U2’s deviation. In order to analyze the proﬁtability of deviations
at the upstream level, we ﬁrst need to know how U1-D1 best responds to them at the downstream
level. After an upstream deviation in period t, the punishment will be triggered in t+1 regardless
of the downstream price U1-D1 charges in t. Sequential rationality implies that U1-D1 will set its
downstream price such as to maximize its short-run proﬁts. Thus, U1-D1 will always play its best
reply after an upstream deviation, but its best downstream reply following a defection will depend
on whether U1-D1 itself or U2 is the defector.
First, if U1-D1 deviates at the upstream level by charging some cd
2 < c2, U1-D1 will capture
the entire upstream proﬁt in addition to its downstream proﬁt. In that case, U2 earns nothing
and U1-D1’s defection proﬁt is equal to the joint proﬁt of U1-D1 and U2 which is maximized if
and only if p1 = b p1(cd
2) where b p1 is as in (26). Hence, b p1(cd
2) is U1-D1’s optimal downstream price
in this case.
Second, if U2 is the deviator at the upstream level and sets some cd
2 < c2, U1-D1 does not
gain any upstream proﬁt. U1-D1’s proﬁt is now equal to D1’s stand-alone proﬁt only which is
maximized if and only if p1 = p∗
1(cd
2). (Recall that p∗
1(cd
2) is D1’s myopic best reply.) Thus, we
have
Lemma 1 If U1-D1 defects by setting cd
2 < c2, U1-D1’s optimal price at the downstream level is
b p1(cd
2). If U2 defects by setting cd
2 < c2, U1-D1’s optimal price at the downstream level is p∗
1(cd
2).
31Note that U1-D1 will best respond at the downstream level in period t only if there has been a
defection at the upstream level in t in the ﬁrst place. If U1-D1 defects from the collusive p1 even
though both ﬁrms charge the equilibrium c2 at the upstream level, the punishment will nevertheless
be triggered in t+1. But if collusion breaks down in the next period anyway, U1-D1 can increase
its defection proﬁt by deviating from c2 before deviating from p1.
Step 2: Optimal deviation at the upstream level. If U1-D1 defects at the U level, we know
from Lemma 1 that it will charge b p1(cd
2) afterwards at the D level. This implies that the highest
defection proﬁt U1-D1 can obtain occurs if c2 = c
jpm
2 as in (8). Since U1-D1’s defection proﬁt
monotonically increases in c2 as long as c2 ≤ c
jpm
2 , we conclude that U1 -D1’s optimal defection is
c2−ε if c2 ≤ c
jpm
2 and the optimal defection is c
jpm
2 if c2 > c
jpm
2 , where ε denotes an inﬁnitesimally
small margin.
If U2 defects, we know from Lemma 1 that U1-D1 will set p∗
1(cd
2) at the D level. With a
downstream price of p∗
1(c2), the highest defection proﬁt U2 can obtain results when U2 charges
cmon
2 as in (9). Since U2’s proﬁt monotonically increases in c2 up to cmon
2 , U2’s optimal defection
is c2 − ε if c2 ≤ cmon
2 and it is cmon
2 if c2 > cmon
2 . Hence, we obtain
Lemma 2 U1-D1’s optimal upstream defection is cd








2 . U2’s optimal upstream defection is cd
2 = c2−ε if c2 ≤ cmon
2 and cd
2 = cmon
2 if c2 > cmon
2 .
when U1-D1 and U2 deviate, respectively.
Step 3: Defection proﬁts. We can use Lemmas 1 and 2 to derive the proﬁts resulting from a
deviation.




πjpm if c2 > c
jpm
2







2 if c2 > cmon
2
c2Q∗
2(c2,0) if c2 ≤ cmon
2 .
Step 4. Collusive downstream prices that minimizes the discount factor required for collusion.
For some given collusive upstream price c2, it is easy to see that the collusive downstream price
32that minimizes the discount factor required for collusion is p1 = b p1(c2). The intuition is that the
defection proﬁts stated in Lemma 3 do not depend on p1. If neither defection nor punishment
proﬁts are aﬀected by the collusive p1, the incentive constraints are relaxed as far as possible when
the collusive proﬁts are maximized. This is the case if and only if p1 = b p1(c2).
To prove this claim, note that U1-D1’s collusive proﬁt is p1Q1(p1,p2(c2)) + sc2Q2(p2(c2),p1).
Plugging this expression for the collusive proﬁt, its defection proﬁt πd
1, as in Lemma 3, and the
static Nash proﬁt π∗
D1(0,0) into the incentive constraint (3), we obtain
πd





for U1-D1. U2’s collusive proﬁt is (1−s)c2Q2(p2(c2), b p1(c2)), its defection proﬁt is πd
2 as in Lemma
3, and the static Nash proﬁt is zero. Thus, (3) becomes
πd














Since the defection proﬁts, πd
i (as in Lemma 3), do not depend on p1, choosing p1 to maximize
p1Q1(p1,p2(c2)) + c2Q2(p2(c2),p1) relaxes the incentive constraints as far as possible. This is the
case if and only if p1 = b p1(c2). Since b p1(c2) also maximizes collusive proﬁts (for any c2), it is
optimal also when the incentive constraint is not binding. Thus, we have established
Lemma 4 Given some collusive upstream price c2, the collusive downstream price that minimizes
the discount factor required for collusion is b p1(c2).
Step 5: Collusive upstream price that minimizes the discount factor required for collusion.
Lemma 5 The collusive upstream price that minimizes the discount factor required for collusion
is c2 = c
jpm
2 .
From Lemma 3, optimal defection strategies of the upstream ﬁrms will diﬀer depending on c2.
We need to distinguish between three parameter regions: (i) c2 ≥ c
jpm
2 , (ii) cmon
2 ≤ c2 < c
jpm
2 , and
33(iii) c2 < cmon
2 . We need to consider optimal upstream pricing in each of these three regions in
order to conclude the overall optimal price.
(i) If c2 ≥ c
jpm
2 , Lemma 4 implies a collusive proﬁt of b p1Q1(b p1(c2),p2(c2))+sc2Q2(p2(c2), b p1(c2))
for U1-D1 and Lemma 3 implies a defection proﬁt of πjpm for U1-D1. For U2, we obtain a collusive
proﬁt of (1−s)c2Q2(p2(c2), b p1(c2)) and a defection proﬁt of πmon
2 . Punishment proﬁts are π∗
D1(0,0)
and zero for U1-D1 and U2, respectively. Adding up the incentive constraints, (3) yields
πjpm + πmon





It is useful to solve this expression for δ
δ ≥
πjpm + πmon





Since c2 ≥ c
jpm
2 , the term b p1Q1(.) + c2Q2(.) is decreasing in c2. This implies that the minimum




2 ≤ c2 < c
jpm
2 , U1-D1 has a collusive proﬁt of b p1Q1(.) + sc2Q2(.) and a defection
proﬁt of b p1Q1() + c2Q2(.). U2, has a collusive proﬁt of (1 − s)c2Q2(p2(c2), b p1(c2)) and a defection
proﬁt of πmon
2 . Punishment proﬁts are as above. Adding up the incentive constraints, we get
πmon













Since the term b p1Q1(.)+c2Q2(.) is increasing in c2, a higher c2 in region (ii) reduces the discount
factor required for collusion and yields higher collusive proﬁts.
(iii) If c2 < cmon
2 , U1-D1 has a collusive proﬁt of b p1Q1(.) + sc2Q2(.) and a defection proﬁt of
b p1Q1() + c2Q2(.). U2, has a collusive proﬁt of (1 − s)c2Q2(p2(c2), b p1(c2)) and a defection proﬁt of
c2Q∗
2. Adding up the incentive constraints, we get
c2Q∗













Both the numerator and the denominator are increasing in c2 but since ∂(b p1Q1(.)+c2Q2(.))/∂c2 > 0
when c2 < cmon
2 , the numerator increases more quickly in c2. Therefore, the minimum discount
factor is decreasing in c2 and collusive proﬁts are increasing in c2.
34Taking the parameter regions (i) to (iii) together, the minimum discount factor is decreasing in
c2 as long as c2 < c
jpm
2 and it is increasing in c2 if c2 > c
jpm
2 . Thus, choosing c2 = c
jpm
2 minimizes
the discount factor required for collusion. As c2 = c
jpm
2 also maximizes the collusive proﬁts, the
optimal upstream price is c2 = c
jpm
2 .
Step 6: Completion of the proof. We note that, from Lemma 4, the optimal downstream price
conditional on c2 is b p1(c2) and, from Lemma 5, that the optimal upstream price is c2 = c
jpm
2 .
Hence, the overall optimal downstream price is b p1(c
jpm
2 ) = p
jpm
1 . Using c2 = c
jpm
2 in the proﬁt
expressions in Lemma 3 yields the defection proﬁts in Proposition 3. This completes the proof of
Proposition 3.
Appendix B: Optimal collusion with linear demand
Step 1: Derivation of the joint-proﬁt maximum. Proposition 3 shows that optimal collusion involves
the joint-proﬁt maximizing prices. Therefore, we need to ﬁnd
argmax
c2,p1
p1Q1(p1,p2) + c2Q2(p2,p1). (35)
Assuming the linear demand function in (19), the joint proﬁts are
p1 (1 − kp1 + dp2) + c2 (1 − kp2 + dp1). (36)
We ﬁrst solve for the downstream prices. The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to p1 is 1 −
2kp1 + dp2 + c2d = 0. D2 plays the myopic best reply to p1 given the price of the input, c2. D2’s
proﬁt is p2 (1 − kp2 + dp1), and the ﬁrst-order condition is 1 − 2kp2 + dp1 + kc = 0. We use these
two ﬁrst-order conditions to ﬁnd the explicit solution for the downstream prices for a given c2
p1 =
2k + d + 3kc2d
4k2 − d2 (37)
p2 =
2k + d + c2(2k2 + d2)
4k2 − d2 . (38)
We now derive the joint-proﬁt maximizing upstream price. Plugging the downstream prices
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at the upstream level.









2 . Its punishment proﬁt is π∗
D1(0,0). U2’s defection proﬁt is πmon
2 , and
its punishment proﬁt is zero. Thus, we still need to derive πmon
2 and π∗
D1(0,0). Both expressions
depend on downstream prices p∗
i(ci,cj), that is, the prices that maximize the short-run proﬁts of Di.
With the linear demand speciﬁcation, Di’s proﬁt is πDi = (1−kpi +dpj)(pi −ci), i,j,= 1,2;i 6= j
and myopic maximization at the downstream level yields Nash equilibrium prices of
p∗
i(ci,cj) =
2k + d + 2k2ci + kdcj




2k + d − (2k2 − d2)ci + kdcj
4k2 − d2 (47)
(see also OSS, 1990). Downstream proﬁts are π∗
Di(ci,cj) = (Q∗






The monopoly price, cmon
2 , maximizes c2Q∗
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(4k4 − d4)(2k − d)
k2 (8k2 + d2)
2 (k − d)
. (54)
Step 4. Optimal markets shares. Optimal market shares should be ﬁxed such that they minimize
max{δU1−D1,δU2}. Since δU1−D1 is decreasing in s whereas δU2 is increasing in s, the optimal s
solves δU1−D1 = δU2. Explicit solutions for the optimal s, s∗, and the resulting minimum discount
factor can be obtained but they are not particularly informative. These solutions are plotted in
Figure 1.
Appendix C: U2-D2 counter merger
When prices are c2 = c
jpm
2 and p1 = p
jpm
1 , D2’s proﬁt is (Q
jpm
2 )2/k where Q
jpm
2 is as in (43). The




2 as in (45). The joint proﬁt of U2 and D2, denoted by πU2−D2,
is (Q
jpm







2k2 + d2 8k3(3/2 − s) − 2kd(2k − d) − d3(1 + s)
2k(8k2 + d2)
2 (k − d)
. (55)
The joint proﬁt of U2 and D2 in the static Nash equilibrium is k/(2k − d)
2. A counter merger
will not occur if πU2−D2 ≥ k/(2k − d)
2 .
Suppose that s = 0, that is, U2 gets the entire upstream proﬁt. In that case
πU2−D2|s=0 =
 
2k2 + d2 12k3 − 2kd(2k − d) − d3
2k(8k2 + d2)
2 (k − d)
. (56)
37But πU2−D2|s=0 < k/(2k − d)
2 as long as d < 2.614 (where k = d + 1 w.l.o.g.). Thus, if products
are suﬃciently heterogenous, charging c2 = c
jpm
2 and p1 = p
jpm
1 induces the counter merger even
if U2 gets all the upstream proﬁt.
Suppose next that d ≥ 2.614 such that πU2−D2|s=0 ≥ k/(2k − d)
2. We can calculate the
maximum upstream market share U1-D1 may get such that U2-D2 do not ﬁnd the counter merger
worthwhile. This level of s is
s = −
8k5 + 4k4d − 22k3d2 + 4k2d3 − 4d4k + d5
(2k + d)(2k2 + d2)(2k − d)
2 (57)
which is non-negative if and only if d ≥ 2.614. One can show that this level of s is smaller than the
s∗ in Figure 1 that minimizes the critical discount factor. That is, in order to prevent the counter
merger, U2’s market share (1 − s) must be larger than 1 − s∗. Thus, when ﬁrms charge c2 = c
jpm
2
and p1 = p
jpm
1 , they cannot prevent the counter merger.
Finally, consider the claim that c2 = c∗
2 and an appropriately chosen s will actually prevent the
counter merger. OSS (1990, p. 141) show that the input price c∗
2 = (2k + d)d2/(2k2(2k2 − d2))
is suﬃciently low to prevent U2 and D2 from integrating. As for the downstream price, set
p1 = b p1(c∗
2) as in (26). Setting c = c∗
2 and p1 = b p1(c∗
2) yields
πU2−D2 =
(4k4 − 4d2sk2 + d4(1 + s))
 
2k4 − 2d2k2 + d4
2k3 (2k − d)
2 (2k2 − d2)
2 . (58)
Now from
πU2−D2 − k/(2k − d)
2 = d24k4d2 − 8sk6 + 10d2sk4 − 6d4sk2 − 2d4k2 + d6 + d6s
2k3 (2k − d)
2 (2k2 − d2)
2 (59)
and
πU2−D2 − k/(2k − d)|s=0 =
1
2
d2 4k4d2 − 2d4k2 + d6
k3 (2k − d)
2 (2k2 − d2)
2 > 0 (60)
it follows that there always exist a suﬃciently low but positive level of s that deters the counter
merger.
Appendix D: Downstream collusion
We will analyze the symmetric case where both downstream ﬁrms choose a collusive price of p.
Thus, collusive proﬁts are (1 − kp + dp)p for each downstream ﬁrm. By defecting, a downstream
ﬁrm can obtain a proﬁt of (1 + dp)
2 /4k. Static Nash proﬁts are k/(2k +d)2 as seen above for D1.









(p(2k − d) − 1)(2k − d)
2
d(p(2kd − d2) + 4k − d)
. (61)
Evaluating this expression at the static Nash price, p = 1/(2k − d), yields δ = 0. The minimum
discount factor is monotonically increasing in p. Evaluating this expression at the joint-proﬁt
maximizing downstream price, p = 1/2(k − d), yields δ ≥ 1/2.
In order to obtain Figure 2, we invert (61) and get the highest sustainable collusive downstream
price as a function of δ. Plugging this expression into (1 − kp + dp)p yields a functional form for
the collusive proﬁt as a function of δ.
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